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Abstract
The propensity to make risky choices has a genetic component, and recent studies have identified several specific genes
that contribute to this trait. Since risk-taking often appears irrational or maladaptive, the question arises how (or if) natural
selection favors risk-taking. Here we show, using a stochastic simulation of selection between two hypothetical species, ‘‘R’’
(risk-seeking) and ‘‘A’’ (risk-averse) that, when expected reproductive fitness of the individual is unaffected by the making of
the risky choice (winnings balanced by losses) natural selection (taken to the point of extinction) favors the risk-averse
species. However, the situation is entirely reversed if offspring are permitted to inherit a small fraction of the parent’s
increased or decreased fitness acquired through risk-taking. This seemingly Lamarckian form of inheritance actually
corresponds to the human situation when property or culture are transmitted in families. In the presence of this ‘‘cultural
inheritance’’, the long-shot risk-taking species was overwhelmingly favored, even when 90% of individuals were rendered
sterile by a losing choice. Given this strong effect in a minimal model, it is important to consider the co-evolution of genes
and culture when interpreting the genetics of risk-taking. This conclusion applies, in principle, to any species where parental
resources can directly affect the fecundity of offspring. It might also be relevant to the effects of epigenetic inheritance, if
the epigenetic state of zygotes can be affected by parental experiences.
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Introduction
The recent financial crisis has shone a bright light on the
tendency of humans to take apparently irrational risks. The
propensity to choose risky behaviors in social situations (impul-
siveness, addiction, conduct disorder) and in economic decisions
(gambling) is known to be influenced by genetic factors [1]. Twin
studies have shown that 20% of the variation in financial risk-
taking in experimental lotteries is genetic [2], as is 35–54% in
compulsive gambling [3]. Recently, particular alleles of several
genes involved in processing of neurotransmitters – monoamine
oxidase (MAOA), the serotonin transporter (5-HTTLPR) and a
dopamine receptor (DRD4) – have been implicated in risk-taking
in behavioral disorders and in experimental financial investing
models, and in gambling [4–7]. It is likely that many other genetic
influences remain to be discovered.
While it has been difficult to establish unambiguous animal
models of gambling behavior [8–11], a natural analog exists, in the
form of risk-sensitive foraging [12]. If individual animals are
confronted with a choice between two feeding alternatives, one of
which provides a certain amount of food, while the other offers an
uncertain yield with the same expected value, they will commonly
show a preference for high or low variance. These traits of risk-
seeking or risk aversion are widespread across phyla, and have
been shown to be partly genetic, though also influenced by
environment and the history of the individual animal [12].
The genetic component of risk-sensitivity might be a coinci-
dental side-effect of selection of genes for other functions in the
nervous system – a spandrel in Stephen Jay Gould’s terminology.
However, in view of the critical importance of risk-management
for the survival of organisms, it is reasonable to suspect that it is
adaptive, i.e. produced by natural selection. Theories of adaptive
risk-sensitive foraging [12–15] have assumed that the animal
implicitly optimizes a currency (e.g. average rate of energy intake)
which is a surrogate for reproductive fitness, the ultimate currency
of evolution. The latter is usually taken to mean expected number
of offspring surviving to reproduce. If the expected yield of
foraging were itself being optimized, then its variance should have
no effect. If, however, the relationship between foraging yield and
reproductive fitness is non-linear – for example if the animal will
starve to death if the current feeding opportunity yields no more
than its expected value – then risk-seeking or risk-averse behavior
would be selected, depending on the direction of the non-linearity.
A similar argument has been applied in the classical economic
theory of maximization of expected personal utility [16], in which
risk aversion is attributed to decreasing marginal utility as a
function of wealth, while long-shot gambling is postulated to be
due to a hypothetical convexity of the utility function at very high
returns.
Such analyses assume that natural selection is tantamount to
rational optimization of the expected number of offspring of an
individual organism. To seek the possible origin of risk-seeking
when there is no apparent benefit, we asked whether the stochastic
process of evolution itself, operating over many generations, would
show a preference for high or low risk in a ‘‘fair’’ match-up in
which the expected number of offspring of each organism was
unaltered by taking the risk. To examine this question in a simple
model, we performed a stochastic, numerical simulation of the
competition between two species which differed in their propensity
to accept a ‘‘fair gamble’’ in which the single-generation fitness
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We found a clear effect of risk per se, but the direction of the effect
was strongly influenced by the inclusion of non-genetic inheritance
in the model.
Results
We constructed a computational model of selection in which
two non-sexual ‘‘species’’ ‘‘R’’(risky) and ‘‘A’’(averse) compete on
equal terms. Each organism begins with the same intrinsic
fecundity g0, (the term fecundity is used here to include both
survival and reproduction over a single generational cycle) but
each ‘‘R’’ organism in each generation experiences a ‘‘risk event’’
in which it may either have its fecundity boosted by a reward
factor r.1, with probability p, or reduced by a penalty factor
(12rp)/(12p) with probability (12p). It is easily verified that the
expected value of g is unchanged by this choice, provided that
r,1/p to avoid the possibility of negative fecundity. The
maximum risk r=1/p corresponds to the situation in which a
loser has no chance to reproduce. Symmetrical competition for
resources was enforced by dividing all fecundities by (1+n/nmax)
where n is the total population of the current generation (both ‘‘R’’
and ‘‘A’’) and nmax is a population scale. For the case g0=2,nmax
approximates the ‘‘carrying capacity’’ of the ‘‘environment’’, and
would be the saturation population size if the model were
deterministic (logistic growth). The actual, realized number of
offspring that each organism contributes to the next generation is
then chosen from a Poisson distribution with mean equal to that
organism’s scaled fecundity w (the absolute fitness according to
traditional definitions).
When r=1 the two species are, in fact, identical since the risk
event then has no effect on fecundity. Competition between
identical species for a single ecological niche is unstable due to
stochastic drift, and one or the other species will eventually go
extinct. For a modest population size (150) this generally took less
than 200 generations. A typical population trajectory is shown in
Figure 1. The model was run until one species went extinct, and
this run was repeated 10,000 times for each chosen combination of
r and p, in order to estimate the frequency with which ‘‘R’’ (risk-
seeking) organisms are the winners of ‘‘natural selection.’’ There is
no mutation or evolution per se in this model; we model only the
process of competitive selection.
As shown in Figures 2A and B, while the success rate of ‘‘R’’ was
50% when r=1, as required by symmetry, it declined at higher
risk levels, even though the single-generation expected fecundity
was unchanged. In other words, stochastic evolutionary selection is
itself risk-averse. As shown in Figure 2B, the magnitude of this risk
aversion depended on the relationship between the risk reward
factor r and the long-shot risk probability p. However, the effect
was entirely independent of population size. Over a 4-fold range of
nmax the survival probability curves were superimposable (not
shown). The degree of risk aversion could be quantified by
determining the amount that the native, intrinsic fecundity g0 of
‘‘R’’ needed to be increased in order to restore parity in the
competition. This ‘‘risk premium’’ is plotted in Figure 3 (dashed
line) as a function of the risk-reward r, for a fixed long-shot
probability p=0.1. Clearly, a gene for gambling would not be
positively selected, in the absence of some other advantage. As
discussed below, this unexpected, intrinsic risk aversion of
stochastic selection stems from the fact that population growth
factors w in successive generations are not statistically indepen-
dent, because fluctuations in fecundity are negatively correlated
with the population saturation (competition) factors in subsequent
generations. As a result, the long-term expected growth rate differs
from that in a single generation, to the disadvantage of the species
with a higher variance in fecundity. Figure 2C shows the
analytically-computed expected population growth after 1 and 2
generations, showing risk aversion that appears only in the second
generation.
This situation was radically altered if the model was changed so
that a small fraction of the reproductive reward or penalty earned
by an individual organism from risk-taking could be passed
directly to the next generation. This was implemented by starting
each organism with a baseline fecundity (12a) g0 + a gparent where
gparent is the achieved fecundity, including risk reward or penalty
(but before population-size scaling) of its parent. This kind of non-
genetic inheritance of a parent’s experience is actually entirely
commonplace in the human population, in the form of inheritance
of property and acquired knowledge. This culturally inherited
wealth may increase the reproductive potential of offspring in the
Figure 1. Trajectory of the populations of two species in the stochastic selection model. The species ‘‘R’’ (solid line) and ‘‘A’’ (dashed line)
were actually identical because the risk-reward r was set to 1. Both species had a baseline fecundity g0=2,i.e. in the absence of risk and competition,
each organism would produce a mean of 2 offspring. The population ceiling parameter nmax was set to 150. The model was run until one species
(‘‘A’’) became extinct, after 220 generations.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0011656.g001
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directly supports or assists its own young might show a similar
effect of parent’s success on offspring’s fecundity.
Figure 4 shows that, when this ‘‘cultural inheritance’’ was
present, the ‘‘gambling’’ species was strongly favored. The ‘‘risk
premium’’ became, instead, a discount (Figure 3, solid curve). In
other words, even the propensity to take an unfair gamble would
still be positively selected. At high levels of reward r the discount
was so steep that the baseline fecundity of ‘‘R’’ could be reduced
below replacement and the species would still survive and prevail,
entirely on the basis of the reproductive advantage an organism
acquires from a winning parent in the previous generation.
Discussion
The fact that, in the absence of non-genetic inheritance, the
risk-averse species is intrinsically favored is counterintuitive and
has a somewhat subtle explanation. The single-generation growth
factor w=gparent/(1+n/nmax) is the ratio of two stochastic variables
that are statistically independent, since the population at the start
of a generation has no correlation with the outcome of the risk
event. The expected single-generation growth is thus the same for
both species, since the expected value of gparent is unaffected by risk
(by construction) and the denominator is symmetrical in the two
species. One might anticipate that the expected growth over
Figure 2. Intrinsic selection against risk-taking species. A. The fraction of 10,000 trials in which the ‘‘R’’ species survived the selection, as a
function of the risk-reward r. The probability p of the risk event was kept constant at 0.1, and nmax at 150 Higher values of r indicate a higher
reproductive advantage for the 10% of ‘‘R’’ organisms that ‘‘win’’ the risk event, but also a correspondingly greater penalty for the 90% that lose, so
that the overall expected fecundity remains at 2. When r=1/p, the losers leave no descendants. B. Similar to A, but showing different values of the
long-shot probability p. C. Analytically computed expectation values of the populations of ‘‘R’’ and ‘‘A’’ organisms after 1 or 2 generations, starting
from 10 of each, with the deterministic saturation population size set to 20 and p=0.1. The effect of risk to depress the expected ‘‘R’’ population
appears only in the second generation, due to correlation between fecundity fluctuations in the first generation and population competition in the
second. Note that even when r=1 both populations are slightly depressed due to the effect of Poisson fluctuations in individual fecundity.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0011656.g002
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growth factors in every generation, but this is not correct. While
gparent is independent of the population in its own generation, it is
not independent of the population in the following generations, for
obvious reasons. The growth factors in different generations are
thus non-independent, so the expectation of the product of single-
generation growth factors is not the same as the product of the
expectations. In fact, because the population saturation function
1/(1+n/nmax) is concave, the long-term expected growth is less, by
an amount that increases with the variance of gparent, a fact which
was confirmed by direct calculation for the 2-generation case
(Figure 2C). Therefore, the lower-variance (i.e. risk-averse) species
is systematically favored. It is at first surprising that this risk-
aversion is independent of population size. One might expect this
fluctuation-driven effect to decrease in larger populations, for
which fluctuations in population size become smaller relative to
the total. However, the risk effect acts as a bias of the random drift
which is the mechanism of extinction in otherwise equivalent
organisms. While the bias becomes smaller per generation, the
number of generations required for drift to produce fixation of one
organism is much larger in a large population, so that the bias has
longer to act, leading to the same probability of the eventual
outcome, as long as there is no systematic selective force.
The risk-advantage produced by ‘‘cultural inheritance’’ is due to
a different kind of intergenerational correlation. The transmission
of property or culture (intellectual property) induces a positive
correlation between the reproductive fitness of parents and
offspring. The expectation of the product of fitnesses over multiple
generations is therefore larger than the product of the single-
generation expected fitness, by an amount that increases with the
size of fluctuations, favoring the species with the higher variance.
Although the mean winnings of risk-takers is zero, or even
negative, the next generation of ‘‘R’’ is disproportionately made
up of children of winners, so they receive a net positive
inheritance. To make the example concrete, imagine a polyga-
mous society in which there is available a very risky financial
opportunity with a 10% chance of multiplying the investment 10-
fold, but a 90% chance of bankruptcy. Ten risk-averse men can
each support one wife, and leave one son each. Ten men with a
risk-taking gene on the Y-chromosome invest their life-savings;
nine go bankrupt and cannot afford a wife and children, while one
receives a windfall enabling him to support a harem that gives him
10 sons. In the second generation there are again 10 risk-averse
men who will each have one son, and there are still 10 risk-taking
men, each of whom has inherited one tenth of his father’s winnings
in addition to his own savings. One of these receives a windfall –
now twice that of his father – enabling him to support a harem
Figure 3. Risk premium/discount. Dashed curve: The selective
disadvantage of the risk-taking ‘‘R’’ species, expressed as a ‘‘risk
premium’’: the percentage increase in baseline fecundity of ‘‘R’’ needed
to maintain a 50-50 split in the outcomes of selection trials. P=0.1,
nmax=150 Solid curve: In the presence of ‘‘cultural inheritance’’
(a=0.091 corresponding to a wealth persistence time of 1.1 genera-
tions) the risk ‘‘premium’’ is strongly negative, i.e. a discount, indicating
that the propensity to take even an unfair gamble is positively selected.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0011656.g003
Figure 4. Selective advantage of risk-taking in the presence of ‘‘cultural inheritance’’. a. Fraction of selection trials won by the ‘‘R’’ species,
as in Figure 2A, but for the case where an ‘‘R’’ organism inherits a fraction a of the reproductive advantage or disadvantage obtained by its parent,
before undergoing its own risk event. Note that there is a slight droop in the curves at the highest risk levels, indicating that the intrinsic risk aversion
of due to population fluctuations is still active as in Fig. 2A,B, but is overcome by the accumulation of ‘‘inherited wealth’’ even at the smallest valueo f
a The dashed line shows the effect of doubling the population size, which increases the selective pressure of ‘‘wealth’’ relative to drift. b. Probability
that a single ‘‘R’’ organism with g0=1.5 will invade and replace a population of 149 ‘‘A’’ organisms with g0=2, despite the ‘‘R’’ having 25% lower
expected reproductive fitness (a=0.091, p=0.1).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0011656.g004
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population now carries the risk taking gene, and the process
continues.
As shown in Figure 4a (dashed curve), this risk-advantage,
unlike the intrinsic risk aversion in the purely genetic case above, is
not independent of population size, but instead increases with
population. This is because the correlation between fecundity
fluctuations of parent and offspring, unlike that due to population
fluctuations, does not decrease with population size, making it a
systematic selective force. The effect of population size is shown in
Figure 5 for several values of a, at the maximum risk level r=1/p.
The positive correlation effect due to cultural inheritance
competes with the negative correlation effect due to population
fluctuations (which scales like drift). The careful reader will also
notice a very slight droop in the curves in Figure 4a at the highest
risk levels due to this competition.
The effect of the positive correlation is cumulative over
generations. This requires further comment in relation to the
concept of fitness. The model has been constructed so that the
expected number of offspring is either unaffected by taking the
gamble, or – in the case of an unfair gamble – is actually reduced.
In particular, the expected number of offspring of ‘‘R’’ is the same
or less than that of ‘‘A’’ in the first generation. However, the
operation of the cultural inheritance mechanism will result in the
accumulation of ‘‘family wealth’’, so that, in later generations, the
expected number of offspring of ‘‘R’’ will be higher than that of
‘‘A’’. It is misleading to think of this as implying that risk-taking
increases individual fitness in the usual sense. For an ‘‘A’’
individual offered an unfair gamble, the rational strategy to
maximize the expected number of his own offspring would be to
save his inherited wealth in a risk-less asset and ‘‘mutate’’ to
become risk-averse. However, if he did so, his family wealth would
dissipate over a few generations and his line would become extinct
in competition with continuing risk takers. The family wealth is
maintained, not by any fitness advantage of gambling, but by the
statistical correlation between gambling success and natural
selection in the following generations.
This reveals an ambiguity in the concept of evolutionary fitness.
The true fitness of an organism is the a posteriori realized number of
offspring that it contributes to the next generation, in its actual
environment (including the effect of other organisms). In this sense,
evolution is indisputably the result of higher fitness operating over
many generations. But a single organism does not evolve. When
we speak of the fitness of an individual organism, there is implied
some kind of a priori expectation value. As shown by our examples,
when risk is involved, an expectation taken in a single generation
does not successfully predict the outcome of selection, because it
neglects inter-generational correlations, due either to population
size fluctuations or to cultural or epigenetic effects. Therefore, we
would favor Darwin’s term ‘‘natural selection’’ over Spencer’s
‘‘survival of the fittest.’’
The accumulation of family wealth in the ‘‘R’’ population can
be estimated. Starting with a population of ‘‘R’’ whose average
fecundity in the i’th generation is ,gi., we estimate the number of
winners and losers, and the respective numbers of offspring of
winners and losers, and the values of g that they inherit, and then
average those values over the next generation to obtain ,gi+1..
After some algebra, the result is:
vgiz1w~
avgiw pr2{2prz1
  
1{p
z 1{a ðÞ g0
This is a linear recurrence relationship (finite-difference
equation) for ,g. describing the accumulation of average
fecundity ‘‘wealth’’ over generations. As long as a,p, the
coefficient of the linear term on the right will be less than 1 for
all allowed risk levels (r,1/p)s o,g. will converge asymptotically
to a steady value higher than g0.I fa.p there will be risk levels for
which wealth increases exponentially over generations, which
might make sense in financial terms but is unrealistic in terms of
fecundity. To keep things simple and maintain explicit symmetry
between the two species, the competition model was set up in such
a way that the carrying capacity is proportional to the expected
fecundity. As a result, in the presence of cultural inheritance,
accumulated wealth can substantially increase the saturation
population size. This is generally in keeping with the human
experience, but since large increases in individual fecundity are
unrealistic, we examined also a model in which the saturation
denominator was computed from the sum of g21 (at birth, before
the risk event) rather than the physical number of organisms. This
is tantamount to assuming that wealth places a proportional
burden on resources. In this version, the saturation population
stayed very close to nmax but the results (not shown) were otherwise
virtually identical to those shown above, the only difference being
an increase in the slight ‘‘droop’’ in Figure 4 at the highest risk
levels, due to a greater drift effect in the smaller population.
There is an intriguing, real-world case that bears a surprising
degree of resemblance to our cartoon example of polygamous risk-
takers. Zerjal et al [17] found a unique cluster of Y-chromosome
haplotypes distributed throughout northern Asia at the extraor-
dinary frequency of 8% coextensive with the boundaries of the
former Mongol Empire founded by Genghis Khan. They provided
evidence that this is, in fact, the Y-chromosome of Genghis Khan
and his close male relatives, amplified enormously by ‘‘social
selection’’ as a result of their founding of long-lived male dynasties
whose rulers had very large numbers of children and passed their
power (culturally) down the direct male line for centuries There is
Figure 5. Effect of population size on selection for or against
the risk-taking species. The fraction of trials in which the ‘‘R’’ species
prevailed, at the maximum risk level (r=10, p=0.1) as a function of the
population size parameter nmax for several values of the ‘‘cultural
inheritance’’ rate a, or in the absence of cultural inheritance (a=0).
When a=0 there is no systematic effect of population size, because the
‘‘intrinsic risk aversion’’ due to the negative correlation of population-
size fluctuations between generations scales in the same way as drift.
When a.0 the positive inter-generational fecundity correlation
competes with intrinsic risk aversion, prevailing in larger populations
and higher values of a.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0011656.g005
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but the early Mongols were notoriously daring. Since it is
estimated that ,4% of autosomes and 2.7% of X-chromosomes
in the region are also descended from Genghis Khan, it might be
fruitful to look for an excess of risk-taking genes in that population.
Limitations
The results from our simplified model must be applied with
caution to real biological and social situations, because of three
kinds of limitations: (1) human and animal risk-taking is
complicated and controlled by many genes; (2) there could be
other evolutionary processes that would lead to apparently
irrational risk sensitivity; (3) recombination in a sexually
reproducing species might substantially affect the dynamics of
selection.
(1) Risk-sensitivity in man and other animals is complex,
involving sequential life-history choices with genetic and
environmental components and a strong interaction between
the two [12]. In social species, selection for risk-taking
behavior is also likely to be coupled to group interactions,
hierarchy, altruism, etc. The evidence for irrationality in
human risk sensitivity goes beyond gambling against the odds,
and includes the ‘‘framing’’ effect, in which the willingness to
take risks depends on whether they are presented in terms of
gain or loss – an asymmetry that cannot be explained by any
form of utility maximization [18]. Framing is sensitive to
social and ethical value judgments (see [19] for a nice
summary of the literature on this point). The risk-processing
mechanisms in the brain responsible for such phenomena are
a subject of active study. The kinds of heuristics used by the
brain to respond to risky choices may be constrained as much
by the limitations of neuroanatomy and physiology as by the
evolutionary fitness effects of risk.
(2) To know whether a gamble is a fair deal requires the organism
to estimate quantitively the small probability of winning, and
to effectively multiply this small number by the large payoff;
neither of these quantitative operations is very practical in the
natural world. An organism in an environment where most
long-shot risks have positive expected payoff might evolve a
simpler strategy: Always take the risk. Such an organism
would perform disastrously when placed in a casino, but that
would be merely a side effect of adaptation to a different
environment. However, our model shows that even in an
environment where every risk is a losing proposition in
individual fitness terms, risk-taking can still be subject to
positive selection if there is non-genetic inheritance.
While our model does not prove the necessity of non-genetic
inheritance for the evolution of risk-seeking, the powerful
effect it exerts in this simplified model suggests that it needs to
be taken into consideration whenever cultural or epigenetic
inheritance is present in more realistic situations. We modeled
only symmetrical competition in which the reproduction of all
individuals is equally depressed by the overall population size.
Therefore, there is only one ecological niche, and no chance
for the formation of a stable behavioral polymorphism of the
kind that has been proposed as an explanation for animal
personalities [20]. Our model differs also from the approach
taken in evolutionary game theory [21–22] in which there is
explicit competition between individuals in the same gener-
ation, so that fecundity gain by one organism represents a loss
for others. In the extreme case of ‘‘winner take all’’
competition, such as the competition for mates among lekking
birds, long-shot risk taking can be favored [23] because in a
sufficiently large population there will always be at least one
winner, who gets to father the entire next generation (this may
be regarded as a convex nonlinear relationship between
‘‘earnings’’ and fecundity, analogous to the starving-animal
paradigm in risk-sensitive foraging theory).
(3) Our simulation methods can be applied to the more realistic
case in which risk-seeking and risk-averse alleles compete
within a single sexually-reproducing species. To do this
requires consideration of a great number of different cases.
The fecundity phenotype needs to be specified for all possible
matings of homozygote and heterozygote winners and losers.
In the case of cultural or epigenetic inheritance, the manner in
which ‘‘wealth’’ is transmitted to offspring as a function of
gender (and perhaps birth order) needs to be specified, as well
as the effects of assortive mating, which is the rule in human
populations in relation to culture and material wealth. These
studies will be important before the theory can be compared
to empirical data. Because of the large numbers of scenarios
that need to be simulated, we have elected not to consider the
sexual case in this paper. We can point out, however, that as
long as the inheritance system is such that acquired fitness
exerts a positive effect on the fitness of offspring, the
correlations that favor risk-taking genes will exist.
While we have been motivated mainly by the human case, in
which the propensity of some individuals to take unfair, long-shot
gambles is most striking, a similar effect might occur in any species
with overlapping generations. The contribution of parental
nurturing to survival of the young is already taken into account
in the definition of reproductive fitness of the parent (we
conceptualize the life cycle as going from one reproductively
competent adult to the next). However, any direct contribution of
parental resources to reproductive success of the offspring in the
next generation would have an effect similar to cultural
inheritance in our model. Even in species without overlapping
generations, parental effects transmitted through the egg can
propagate parental experience to affect offspring fecundity [24].
Another form of non-genetic inheritance is the epigenetic
modification of genes in the zygotes. It has been shown that
environmental and nutritional influences can alter trans-genera-
tional epigenetic gene regulation [25–26]. This might potentially
produce effects analogous to cultural inheritance. It is reasonable,
then, to consider a role for non-genetic inheritance when
interpreting risk-sensitivity of decision-making behavior across
the animal kingdom.
Materials and Methods
The stochastic selection algorithm was implemented in Fortran.
The population of a species was represented by an array listing the
initial fecundity g of each of the organisms. At the start this was set
to g0 for all organisms, where this constant could be chosen
separately for each species. One generation of reproduction
consisted of the following: For each ‘‘R’’ organism, a uniform
random number between 0 and 1 was chosen, and if it was less
than a fixed probability p, the initial fecundity was multiplied by r,
the risk reward factor (.1); otherwise it was multiplied by (12rp)/
(12p) which is less than 1. This gave the organism’s unconstrained
fecundity gparent (i.e. the expected number of offspring that it would
contribute to the next reproductive generation if there were not
competition for resources). For the ‘‘A’’ species, the risk event was
omitted. The actual, realized number k of offspring contributed to
the next generation by an organism was chosen from a Poisson
distribution with mean w=gparent/(1+n/nmax) where n is the total
Evolution of Risk-Taking
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generation. The organism was then replaced in the array by k
entries ‘‘born’’ with initial fecundity (12a) g0 + a gparent. For the
case of purely genetic inheritance, a=0. For the version of the
model with constant carrying capacity, the total population n in
the saturation denominator was replaced by the sum of (12a) g0 +
a gparent21 over all organisms.
Starting from a population containing equal numbers of each
species, the above generation cycle was repeated until the number
of organisms of one species reached zero (extinction) as shown in
Figure 1. This selection process was repeated 10,000 times to
estimate the frequency with which ‘‘R’’ was the winning species,
plotted in Figures 2A,B, 4a and 5. The probability of invasion
(Figure 4b) was calculated similarly, but starting with nmax21 ‘‘A’’
organisms and only a single ‘‘R’’. To calculate the risk premium,
the g0 value of ‘‘R’’ was adjusted up or down manually until
exactly 50% of the selection runs resulted in survival of ‘‘R’’. The
required change in g0 was plotted as a percentage in Figure 3.
The methods used in these simulations are analogous to the
techniques used to predict the survival of endangered species in
population viability analysis (cf. [27]). We have the advantage of
being able to invent the demographic parameters instead of having
to measure them over decades, and we have omitted such effects as
age/stage stratification, spatial variability, sub-populations, migra-
tion and continuous-time demographic events that will eventually
need to be considered to extend our arguments to realistic species.
In order to demonstrate that the ‘‘intrinsic risk aversion of
selection’’ arose from correlations between growth rate fluctua-
tions in different generations, we computed analytically the
expected population sizes after igen generations. This proved
surprisingly difficult. It requires summing over all the possible
population paths defined by the numbers of offspring of each
organism in each generation, weighted by their probabilities, an
impossible task. Fortunately, our model represented risk as a
simple dichotomy (win vs. lose) which enables the state of the
population to be described by a single binomial distribution, and
the stochasticity of individual reproduction was represented by a
Poisson distribution, which has the convenient property that the
sum of multiple Poisson variates is again Poisson. This allowed
lumping of organisms into three pools – winners, losers and risk-
averse, by which means we arrived at the following recursive
equation for the expected number of ‘‘R’’ individuals after igen
generations, starting with nr risk-taking and na risk-averse
organisms in the first generation:
with the understanding that when igen=0,R=nr. A similar function
applies to ‘‘A’’. The operation of this equation may require some
clarification. At entry to the ‘‘top level’’ of function R on the left, the
function is presented with the integer numbers of ‘‘R’’ and ‘‘A’’
organisms in the first generation. The function considers all possible
integer numbers of winners and losers and the possible integer
numbers of of offspring they might produce at the end of the first
generation. The probabilities of all these possible second-generation
populations are computed and used as weightingfactors multiplying
the (non-integer) expected numbers of organisms after the
remaining igen21 generations. The latter is computed by a second,
recursive call to the function R itself. The top level of this call
receives as input the integer numbers of ‘‘R’’ and ‘‘A’’ in (each of)
the hypothetical second generations. The number of remaining
generations is decremented by one on each successive nested call,
until, when there are no generations left, the innermost call of R
simply returns the population size it was presented with. At each
level, an independent quadruple sum is carried out over the possible
productions of that generation, so that eventually the top level of R
returns an average of the final population size taken over all possible
intermediate population histories weighted by their likelihood. In
each probability computation, the saturation denominator is
calculated using the integer number of organisms present in that
hypothetical generation, so that the fluctuations in competition are
fully accounted for.
This function was computed numerically by a recursive Fortran
subroutine. The comparatively compact form of the equation
belies the huge number of individual function evaluations, which
increases exponentially with the number of generations, and
approximately as the 8
th power of the population size when
igen=2. This limited numerical evaluation to one or two
generations and a small population (10 of each species with
nmax=20), which still required several hours of computer time on a
3 GHz Pentium. This proved sufficient to demonstrate the
principle (Figure 2C). Even though the expected output of the
second generation was the same for both species for each possible
input coming from the first generation, the two-generation
expected growth rate differed, due to correlation between the
fluctuations of realized w between generations.
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